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Articles by Aureva
Investing for the Long Term: The 80-20 Hybrid Might Just Be the Best Choice for You
Same 9% Returns, Vastly Different Outcomes: The Retirement Risk That Can Drain Your Corpus
One Category, Three Strategies: How SEBI’s New SIFs Are Redefining Equity Long-Short Investing
Your Worst-Performing Flexi Cap May Still Outpace Your Best FD — and What That Says About Tax
What 26 Years of Nifty 50 Data Teach Us About Long-Term Investing
Last 26 years have seen several major stock market crashes — dot-com bust, demonetization, Global Financial Crisis, COVID pandemic, and now oil price shock — and yet analysis of Nifty 50 over these years delivers two unambiguous verdicts: patience pays and timing the market doesn't matter.
We looked at 26 years of Nifty 50 data — from January 2000 to December 2025. During this time, Nifty 50 rose from 1,592 to 26,129 points — a compound annual growth rate of 11.36%, a return that easily beats your safe bank FDs. So, only if you had sat through all the chaos patiently, you would be much better off today.
A 20% Fall Is Not a Crisis
Markets are inherently volatile and a 10–20% intra-year fall is a common occurrence. Across the 26 years, Nifty 50's average annual drawdown — the maximum intra-year fall from any point — was 19.3%. The median fall was 15%. Only in four out of twenty-six years did Nifty fall less than 10% intra-year. In 22 out of 26 years — 85% of the years — Nifty fell at least 10% intra-year from its peak.
| Intra-year Fall | No. of Years | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Mild (< 10%) | 4 years | 2014, 2017, 2023, 2025 |
| Moderate (10–20%) | 14 years | 2010, 2012, 2016, 2019, 2022 |
| Elevated (20–30%) | 4 years | 2002, 2004, 2006, 2011 |
| Severe (> 30%) | 4 years | 2000, 2001, 2008, 2020 |
What this implies is that an investor who exits the market every time Nifty falls 10% is, statistically speaking, exiting almost every single year — and is simply sitting out of equity investing altogether.
The Luckiest, the Unluckiest, and the SIP Investor
Does timing matter? Imagine three investors who each put ₹1 lakh once into the Nifty 50 every year from 2000 to 2025 — a total of ₹26 lakhs over 26 years.
- The Luckiest Investor invests on the lowest closing day of every single year.
- The Unluckiest Investor invests at the highest closing day of every year.
- The Systematic Investor simply invests on the first trading day of every year.
| Investor | Strategy | Final Corpus | XIRR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Luckiest Investor | Bought at lowest point every year | ₹2.33 Crores | 14.26% |
| Systematic Investor | Bought on 1st trading day, every year | ₹1.88 Crores | 12.62% |
| Unluckiest Investor | Bought at highest point every year | ₹1.51 Crores | 11.75% |
So how much alpha does perfect timing create? Just 1.64 percentage points in XIRR over a SIP investor. With 26 years of flawless timing, the luckiest investor created just 24% more total wealth than the SIP investor. The unlucky investor's 11.75% XIRR — achieved by buying at the wrong time, every time — still comfortably beat inflation and outperformed FD returns by roughly five percentage points.
How Long Before a Lumpsum Investor Sees a Profit?
There were 6,466 trading days in these 26 years. If you had invested in Nifty 50 on any given day, there was a 54% probability that the very next day you would see a profit. This probability rises to 90% within a month and to nearly 99% within a year.
| Period of Investment | Probability of Having a Profit |
|---|---|
| 1 Day | 54% |
| 1 Week (5 trading days) | 79.5% |
| 1 Month (22 trading days) | 91.1% |
| 1 Year (252 trading days) | 98.65% |
The worst case in the entire 26-year dataset was an investor who entered at the peak of the dot-com bubble on February 11, 2000. They waited 966 trading days — just under four years — before seeing the portfolio in green. If your investment horizon is anything less than 4 years, lumpsum investment is not recommended.
The Real Risk Is Behavioural, Not Volatility
The data makes one thing unambiguously clear: staying invested through crashes does not damage your long-term portfolio. However, moving out and missing the recovery phase can.
In 2003, the Nifty rose over 70%. In 2009, it recovered sharply from GFC lows. In 2020, despite a 38% COVID-induced crash, the index ended the year with nearly 15% gains. An investor who sat out even two of those three years would have permanently damaged their long-term returns — costing far more than the entire 251-bps gap between the world's luckiest and unluckiest investor.
The Verdict
26 years of Nifty 50 history makes few things absolutely clear — the market is upward biased over the long term. Time is the primary tool to capture that bias. Good timing adds just a small alpha. Poor timing penalises just a bit. The variable that mattered most was time — just staying invested over various market cycles.
The next time markets fall, as they always do, remember that a 15–20% drawdown is not a crisis. It's a perfectly ordinary year.
What IPL and Mumbai-Pune Expressway Can Teach Us About Investing
Speed has a dark side most people ignore — the extra bit of performance almost always comes with disproportionately higher risk.
Everybody these days is obsessed with speed. Today you can get your cab, groceries, maids and food within 10 minutes. Our bank accounts open instantly and UPI payments happen in milliseconds. This speed has also crept into our investing behaviour — from long term to short term to F&O. But speed has a dark side most people ignore: the extra bit of performance almost always comes with disproportionately higher risk.
The IPL Strike Rate Analogy
We looked at the top 10 scorers of IPL 2025 and 2024 and found 17 unique names. Plotting their IPL career average against career strike rate reveals a clear pattern: beyond a certain strike rate, the average runs scored per innings falls drastically.
| Career Strike Rate | Playing Style | Avg Runs/Innings | Dismissal Risk | Key Players |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 110–125 | Anchor | 40–45 | Low | — |
| 135–140 | Balanced Aggressor | 35–45 | Moderate | Virat Kohli, KL Rahul, Shubman Gill |
| 140–150 | Aggressive | 25–35 | High | Ishan Kishan, Suryakumar Yadav |
| 150–160 | Power Hitter | 25–30 | Very High | Yashasvi Jaiswal, Jos Buttler |
| 160+ | Reckless Slogger | 17–25 | Extreme | Abhishek Sharma, Sunil Narine |
A batter striking at 132 (Virat Kohli's career IPL profile) averages close to 40 per innings. A batter at 163 (Abhishek Sharma) sees the average drop to 27. These ultra-aggressors score around 25% faster per ball but score roughly 30% fewer runs per innings.
Driving on the Mumbai-Pune Expressway
Consider your travel on the Mumbai-Pune Expressway (~100 km). The faster you go, the less time you actually save for every unit of extra risk you take.
| Speed (km/h) | Time Taken (min) | Time Saved | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| 60 | 100 | — | Low |
| 80 | 75 | 25 min | Moderate |
| 100 | 60 | 15 min | Elevated |
| 120 | 50 | 10 min | High |
| 140 | 43 | 7 min | Extreme |
At 140 km/h, you save only 7 additional minutes, but even a small pothole can become a life-threatening event. The reward shrinks, but the risk explodes.
Your Investing Portfolio Works the Same Way
Most investors choose excessive equity due to their obsession with CAGR, ignoring volatility — which determines how frequently their portfolio will crash and how long they'll stay invested. Our analysis of a Hybrid fund composed of Nifty 500 and 5-Year G-Sec indices, rebalanced yearly, showed the following over 23 years (Jan 2003 – Dec 2025):
| Scenario | Equity % | Debt % | CAGR | Volatility | Return Increase | Risk Increase |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 50% | 50% | 13.14% | 10.27% | 0% | 0% |
| B | 60% | 40% | 13.97% | 12.19% | 6.3% | 18.7% |
| C | 70% | 30% | 14.69% | 14.16% | 11.8% | 37.9% |
| D | 80% | 20% | 15.29% | 16.20% | 16.4% | 57.8% |
| E | 90% | 10% | 15.75% | 18.36% | 19.9% | 78.8% |
| F | 100% | 0% | 16.06% | 20.65% | 22.2% | 101.1% |
Moving from a 50:50 portfolio to 100% equity improves CAGR from 13.14% to 16.06% — a 22% improvement — while volatility jumps from 10.27% to 20.65% — a 101% increase. The risk rose roughly 4.5 times faster than the returns.
The Lesson for Investing
Whether it is the expressway, the IPL pitch, or the stock market, the pattern is identical. There is a sweet spot of speed; beyond it, every additional unit of returns comes with a wildly disproportionate amount of risk.
Ultra-aggressive portfolios might make one richer, but they also come with bigger drawdowns, more panic, and a much higher chance of exiting at the worst possible moment.
Investing for the Long Term: The 80-20 Hybrid Might Just Be the Best Choice for You
What if a simple 80:20 mix of equity and debt could deliver similar returns as a pure large-cap equity fund, but with much lower volatility? We backtested 23 years of Indian market data to find out.
The Puzzle That Started This
There is a general assumption that the more debt you have in your portfolio, the poorer your returns will be — even if you reduce volatility. But when you look at the performance of top-performing Large Cap funds vs Aggressive Hybrid funds, the results are exactly the opposite. Aggressive Hybrid funds tend to give better returns than Large Cap funds, with lower volatility.
To remove the variability of fund managers' skills, we backtested two simple indices: Nifty 100 (benchmark for large cap funds) and a Hybrid index consisting of Nifty 500 and Nifty 5-Year Benchmark G-Sec, balanced annually. The analysis ran from 1st Jan 2003 to 31st Dec 2025 — 23 years of data.
Finding 1: The "Free Lunch" of Asset Allocation — The 80:20 Mix
One of the most surprising findings: the 80:20 aggressive hybrid fund generated the exact same IRR (12.77%) and final corpus (~₹1.52 Crores) as the Nifty 100 fund for a SIP investor, but with 23% less volatility (16.22% vs 21.06%). By adding a 20% debt cushion with annual rebalancing, an investor can enjoy large-cap equity returns with significantly lower market swings.
Finding 2: SIP Investors Have Even Less to Lose from Debt
For a lumpsum investor, pure equity delivers 5.85x the final value of pure debt. For a SIP investor, pure equity delivers only 2.21x the returns of pure debt. Rupee-cost averaging smooths out equity volatility's impact, meaning the incremental reward for being fully invested in equity is much smaller for SIP investors.
Finding 3: Debt Does More Good Than Bad
As you increase the debt component, returns drop — but volatility drops much faster. Moving from 100% equity to 60% equity caused XIRR to drop from 16.06% to 13.97% (a 13% drop), while volatility dropped from 20.65% to 12.19% (a 41% drop in risk). Volatility falling faster than IRR leads to better risk-adjusted returns and builds a strong case for diversification.
Finding 4: Conservative Hybrid Over Pure Debt
Adding the first 20% debt cuts volatility by ~4.4 percentage points. The last 20% (from 80% to 100% debt) only cuts it by ~1.7 percentage points. Hence, even for a conservative investor, a portfolio with 20% equity (like conservative hybrid funds) is recommended over 100% debt.
Investor Suitability Matrix
| Profile | Recommended Allocation | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Aggressive, long horizon (20+ yrs) | 100% Nifty 500 | Highest final corpus for both lumpsum and SIP investor |
| Growth-oriented, wants some safety | 80% Nifty 500 / 20% G-Sec | "Free lunch" — matches Nifty 100 return with lower drawdown risk |
| Balanced / typical retail investor, 10–15 yr goal | 60% Nifty 500 / 40% G-Sec | SIP IRR still ~12%, volatility down to 12.2% |
| Approaching retirement (5–10 yrs) | 50/50 or 60/40 (G-Sec heavy) | ~11% IRR for SIP with 9–10% volatility; stronger downside protection |
| Capital preservation / retiree using SWP | 20% Equity / 80% G-Sec | IRR 9.3% with only 5% volatility — far superior to pure debt's 7.6% |
| Pure SIP investor, moderate risk | 80% Nifty 500 / 20% G-Sec | SIP already smooths volatility; rebalancing improves returns |
Same 9% Returns, Vastly Different Outcomes: The Retirement Risk That Can Drain Your Corpus
Two retirees. Identical portfolios. Same average returns. One ends with ₹3.52 crores. The other runs out of money. The difference? The sequence in which returns arrived.
Consider two people retiring at 60, each with an ₹1 crore corpus and a 30-year retirement horizon, each withdrawing ₹4 lakh in the first year and raising it by 5% every year for inflation. They hold an identical portfolio with the same average CAGR over 30 years. Yet one finishes with about ₹3.52 crores, while the other runs out of money.
Sequence of Return Risk: The Illustration
Consider 4 scenarios with zero or negative returns in the initial 3 years. The returns from Year 4–30 recover swiftly such that the portfolio CAGR remains 9%. The base case has 9% p.a. steady return in all years. Withdrawal: 5% inflation-adjusted, starting at ₹4L in Year 1.
| First 3 Years Return | Final Corpus (₹) | vs Base Case | Status at Year 30 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Case (9% p.a.) | ₹3.52 Cr | — | Survives (builds significant estate) |
| Scenario 1: 0% p.a. | ₹1.97 Cr | −₹1.55 Cr (−44%) | Survives |
| Scenario 2: −5% p.a. | ₹90.4 L | −₹2.61 Cr (−74%) | Survives |
| Scenario 3: −7% p.a. | ₹42.4 L | −₹3.09 Cr (−88%) | Survives |
| Scenario 4: −9% p.a. | ₹0 | −₹3.52 Cr (−100%) | Depleted by Year 29 |
Why Does the Sequence Matter?
The mechanism is simple: when you withdraw a fixed amount from a portfolio that has just fallen, you sell more units to raise the money — and those units never recover when the market rebounds. In your saving years, the same effect helps you — a SIP into a falling market buys more units. In retirement, it reverses.
Mathematically, ₹1 lost from your corpus in Year 1 was worth ₹13.27 at Year 30 (at 9% CAGR). The identical ₹1 lost in Year 29 was worth just ₹1.19.
| Timing of 0% Return Window | Final Corpus (₹) | vs Base Case | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early: Years 1–3 | ₹1.97 Cr | −₹1.55 Cr | Most Harmful |
| Mid: Years 14–16 | ₹3.57 Cr | +₹5.23 L | Neutral |
| Late: Years 28–30 | ₹4.48 Cr | +₹96.72 L | Beneficial |
The Inflation Impact
Since the withdrawal is inflation-adjusted, it grows every single year. What begins as ₹4 lakh per year becomes ₹16.46 lakh by Year 30 — the cumulative withdrawal totals ₹2.65 Crores. This worsens sequence damage in the case of an early low-return period, because a depleted corpus must fund an ever-growing withdrawal burden.
| Year | Age | Annual Withdrawal (₹ Lakh) | Cumulative Withdrawal (₹ Lakh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | 61 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| Year 5 | 65 | 4.86 | 22.10 |
| Year 10 | 70 | 6.21 | 50.31 |
| Year 20 | 80 | 10.11 | 132.26 |
| Year 30 | 90 | 16.46 | 265.76 |
The Case for a Balanced Portfolio
The corpus needs to earn enough to beat inflation. However, the retirement period is also a time when one needs stable returns. Some options to consider:
- Move heavily to debt products to ensure steady income — but this requires careful adjustment of lifestyle expenses to meet inflation. A ₹4L expense can balloon 4x to ₹16L+ by the 30th year.
- Hold a balanced portfolio with enough fixed income to soften sequence risk and enough equity to outpace inflation. Holding safer investments lowers potential upside but builds a rock-solid floor under your savings.
One Category, Three Strategies: How SEBI’s New SIFs Are Redefining Equity Long-Short Investing
qSIF, DynaSIF and Diviniti Equity Long-Short all belong to the same SEBI category, yet their net equity exposure ranges from 43% to 77%. Moreover, Diviniti’s short book alone is more than three times the size of the other two funds’ short positions.
The 25% unhedged short derivative flexibility is a distinct feature of SIF. It provides a powerful tool to fund managers to structure exposure that varies widely even within the same category. And that’s the key focus of this article. We studied 3 Equity Long-Short SIF schemes and their portfolio allocation as per their May 2026 factsheets and portfolio allocation sheets.
A brief overview of SIF
Specialised Investment Funds (SIFs) were introduced by SEBI via its circular dated 27 February 2025, effective 1 April 2025, to close the gap between mutual funds — retail-friendly and low entry threshold but limited in flexibility — and PMS, which offered flexibility but required a minimum ₹50 lakh investment. SIFs operate under the same regulatory framework as mutual funds: they are pooled vehicles, run by AMCs, and governed by MF Regulations. Within that framework, however, SIFs are permitted a degree of flexibility ordinary mutual fund schemes are not. This includes the ability to take short positions and run up to 25% in unhedged derivatives i.e. derivative bets that aren’t hedged against an existing position. This provides a lot of flexibility to fund managers.
The minimum investment is ₹10 lakh, positioning SIF between MF and PMS on both flexibility and entry threshold.
The article focuses on the flexibility available to SIFs. Funds operating under the same category can have sharply divergent approach to asset allocation and derivative utilisation. To illustrate, we have picked 3 Equity long short funds and looked at the portfolio allocation closely.
What is an Equity Long-Short Fund— and how does it work?
Per SEBI’s rules, an Equity Long-Short Fund must hold at least 80% in equity and equity-related instruments, with up to 25% unhedged short exposure via exchange-traded derivatives — on top of ordinary hedging or rebalancing trades. Total gross exposure (equity + debt + derivatives) cannot exceed 100% of net assets.
Same category, yet very different exposure through the flexibility provided by unhedged derivatives
Within the Equity Long-Short category alone, 8 schemes together held ₹1,851.68 Cr in AUM as of May 2026, per AMFI’s monthly SIF report. The three funds this series compares are qSIF, DynaSIF, and Diviniti — account for roughly ₹1,272 Cr of that, close to 69% of the category. We picked these funds because of how they diverge across risk band and allocations, despite being under the same category.
This article checks three key factors among others, directly from each factsheet & portfolio allocation disclosures: net market exposure, what the short book is actually doing, and how concentrated the holdings are.
Equity Long-Short SIF — Detailed Strategy Comparison
Source: qSIF (portfolio statement, 29 May 2026) vs. DynaSIF and Diviniti (factsheets, 31 May 2026)
| Parameter | qSIF Equity Long-Short | DynaSIF Equity Long-Short | Diviniti Equity Long Short | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund Identity | ||||
| House / AMC | Quant Mutual Fund | 360 ONE Asset | ITI Mutual Fund | |
| In one line | Concentrated, high-turnover, fully systematic | Broadly diversified, uses both futures & options | Cash-heavy, hedge-first, capital-protection led | |
| AUM | ₹592.47 Cr | ₹276.99 Cr | ₹402.39 Cr | |
| Inception | 7 Oct 2025 | 25 Feb 2026 | 1 Dec 2025 | |
| Benchmark | Nifty 500 TRI | BSE 500 TRI | Nifty 50 TRI | |
| 1. Aggregate Equity Exposure (Equity Book + Net Derivatives) | ||||
| Equity book (long stocks, % of NAV) | 74.53% | 72.07% | 74.69% | Similar gross long equity book. However, the real divergence comes from derivative position |
| (+) Long derivatives — Futures | 9.65% | 14.01% | 0.00% | Diviniti alone does not add long futures on top of its long equity exposure |
| (–) Short derivatives — Futures | -8.71% | -8.53% | -31.24% | Diviniti’s short book alone exceeds qSIF’s and DynaSIF’s short exposure combined — but it’s used to hedge its own holdings, not to take a fresh bet |
| (+/–) Options exposure | 0.00% | -0.04% | 0.00% | Only DynaSIF uses options |
| Net Equity / Market Exposure (subtotal) | ≈75.5% | ≈77.5% | ≈43.5% | A ~34-point spread between the most aggressive (DynaSIF) and most defensive (Diviniti) fund |
| 2. Cash & Money Market (Remainder of NAV) | ||||
| Cash & money market (T-Bills / TREPs / Net Current Asset / other) | ≈24.54% | ≈22.49% | ≈56.54% | Diviniti holds highest buffer among these 3 |
| Total (Net Equity Exposure + Cash & MM) | ≈100% | ≈100% | ≈100% | |
| Other Portfolio Characteristics | ||||
| Number of stocks | 19 | 59 | 34 | qSIF is by far the most concentrated at the stock level; DynaSIF the most diversified |
| Top 10 holdings concentration | 54.75% of NAV | 19.54% of NAV | 43.79% of NAV | |
| Largest single sector | Telecom ≈ 15.02% (Bharti Airtel + Indus Towers, equity only) | Financial Services 14.50% | Financial Services 30.78% (gross) | Financial Services dominates both DynaSIF and Diviniti; qSIF’s largest bet is a telecom pair |
| Regulatory Risk Band | ||||
| SEBI Risk Band — Strategy | Level 4 | Level 5 | Level 3 | Three different bands within one category |
| SEBI Risk Band — Benchmark | Level 5 (Nifty 500 TRI) | Level 5 (BSE 500 TRI) | Level 5 (Nifty 50 TRI) | All three benchmarks sit at Band 5 regardless of the fund’s own band — benchmark risk and strategy risk are reported separately |
The bigger takeaway here is that the SIF label, or even the specific sub-category, doesn’t really tell you much on its own. qSIF, DynaSIF and Diviniti all fall under the same Equity Long-Short mandate, their gross equity books are all clustered around 72–75%, and they’re all benchmarked at the same Level 5 risk band. But look past that and the numbers tell a different story — net exposure ranges from 43% to 77%, the short books differ by more than three times, and the portfolios are built very differently, whether it’s qSIF’s tight 19-stock book or DynaSIF’s much wider spread across 59 names. One fund is using its short derivative allowance to take a market view, while another is using the exact same allowance to hedge and protect capital.
This is really what the flexibility built into SIFs is meant to do, and it works both for and against the investor. Managers get the room to build genuinely different strategies within the same category, but that also means the category name is not so accurate a proxy for how risky or aggressive a fund actually is. So for anyone evaluating a SIF, the real work lies in the factsheet and the portfolio disclosures, not the category tag — things like net exposure, what the short book is actually doing, sector concentration, and the strategy-level risk band need to be looked at together. As more AMCs enter this space and each category starts filling up with multiple funds, this kind of comparison is only going to matter more.
Your Worst-Performing Flexi Cap May Still Outpace Your Best FD — and What That Says About Tax
Data as of 5th July 2026. Figures are illustrative, based on a 30% income-tax slab and prevailing tax rules; both are subject to change. This is an educational analysis, not investment advice — see full disclaimer at the end.
Most of us have grown up hearing the same advice: FDs are safe, equity is risky, so keep your most important money in a safe place. That’s not entirely wrong. Equity can drop 20% in a bad year, and an FD never will. But “safe” need not always be “better”, especially in this case if you are looking at a 10-year time frame. In this piece, we explore a simple question: if you had picked one of the worst-performing diversified equity funds a decade ago, purely by bad luck, would you still have been better off than in the safest fixed-income options?
The model, and its limits
We took the flexi cap mutual fund with lowest return by actual 10-year CAGR, and compared it against the best fixed deposit rate currently on offer from any Indian bank. For investors who want equity-like liquidity without equity-like volatility, we also included the best-performing Arbitrage fund over the same 10-year period. We invested a hypothetical ₹1 crore in each of the three instruments, and compared outcomes before tax and after tax (assuming a 30% income-tax slab).
A few things this model does not capture, and which would change the picture if included:
- Survivorship bias: this looks only at funds that still exist today. Funds that were merged or shut down after poor performance are excluded, so the true “worst case” an investor could have faced is likely worse than what’s shown here.
- A single historical window: this is one 10-year period ending mid-2026, not an average across many starting points. A rolling-window analysis would be more representative.
- Lump sum, not SIP: most retail investors invest via monthly SIPs, not a one-time ₹1 crore. Results for SIP investors could look different.
- FD interest is actually taxed every year, not once at maturity. For simplicity we taxed it once at the end of the tenure, which slightly overstates the FD’s real post-tax corpus — the true gap in favour of equity is likely a little larger than shown.
The results at a glance
Source: All data are as of 5th July 2026; Regular MF schemes
| Instrument | CAGR | Pre-Tax Corpus | Pre-tax gain vs Best FD | Post Tax Corpus | Post-tax gain vs Best FD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flexi Cap with lowest 10Y return — Taurus Flexi Cap | 9.71% | ₹2.53 Cr | 25.5% | ₹2.34 Cr | 36.7% |
| Arbitrage Fund with highest return — Kotak Arbitrage Reg | 5.92% | ₹1.78 Cr | -11.7% | ₹1.68 Cr | -1.6% |
| Bank FD with highest rate — Suryoday Small Finance Bank | 7.25% | ₹2.01 Cr | — | ₹1.71 Cr | — |
Volatility and Risk are two different things
Volatility is a short-term price movement which you experience if you are invested in an equity product. It is the nature of the equity product to be volatile. Volatility does not necessarily mean loss of capital, unless the investor sells the asset when the price is low. On the other hand, an investment that does not give post-tax returns in excess of inflation is leading to permanent loss of purchasing power. This is the risk prevailing in the most popular fixed income product like Fixed Deposit, as our analysis showed.
Taurus Flexi Cap Growth had the least return over the past decade with a 10-year CAGR of 9.71% — a low number by equity standards. Even then, on a pre-tax basis, ₹1 crore in this fund grew to ₹2.53 crore over 10 years, comfortably ahead of the ₹2.01 crore from the best available FD (Suryoday SFB, 7.25%). This is a gap of about 25%. The best arbitrage fund, Kotak Arbitrage Fund Regular, grew the same ₹1 crore to ₹1.78 crore pre-tax — behind the FD. In other words: on pre-tax numbers alone, if your goal is stability rather than growth, a good FD still beats even the best arbitrage fund.
Tax makes a strong case for equity in the long term
The picture shifts once we consider tax. FD interest is taxed every year at your income-tax slab rate (up to 30%, before cess and surcharge). Equity fund gains, by contrast, are taxed only once, at exit, at a flat 12.5% (with a ₹1.25 lakh exemption). That gap compounds over 10 years.
This tax differential, as expected, magnified the gap between the Flexi Cap fund with lowest return and the best FD. The arbitrage fund, which lagged the FD before tax, nearly closed that gap after tax — ₹1.68 crore versus the FD’s ₹1.71 crore. It closes the gap because its gains are taxed at equity-like rates (12.5%) rather than at the investor’s slab rate, even though the underlying strategy (arbitrage) delivers debt-like, low-volatility returns. So, an arbitrage fund essentially matches a top FD’s post-tax return, but with better liquidity and none of the FD’s premature-withdrawal penalty.
What this does — and doesn’t — mean for you
This is neither an argument to move your entire savings into equity tomorrow, nor is it a case for deliberately picking a bad fund. What it does show is that a bad equity outcome, held for a full decade, has historically still outpaced what looked like the “safe” choice — mostly because of how each is taxed, not because equity magically outperforms. If you’re holding a large FD purely because it feels safer, and the money isn’t your emergency fund and has a 10-year-plus horizon, it’s worth asking exactly what that safety is costing you — because the tax structure works against an FD every single year the money sits there.